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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case.
At issue in this appeal is appellant Jordain LeAnn Bradford' s (Jordain) effmis to rescind

a Voluntary Acknowledgment of Paternity (V AP) executed by Jordain and respondent Shad
Lewis Hamberlin (Shad), in which Jordain and Shad voluntarily acknowledged Shad to be the
biological father to Jordain's child, T.J.H., and which the parties filed with the Idaho Bureau of
Vital Records and Health Statistics. Based on the filing of the VAP, the State ofldaho issued a
Ce1tificate of Live Bi1ih identifying Shad as the father ofT.J.H. Jordain now alleges that she
made a material mistake of fact in identifying Shad as T.J.H.'s biological father, and appeals
from the district comi' s Decision on Appeal, in which the district comi, acting in its appellate
capacity, affirmed the magistrate court' s decision denying Jordain' s motion to rescind the VAP.
B. Course of Proceedings.
Shad filed a Petition to Establish Child Custody and Child Suppo1i, in which Shad
requested the patties share joint legal and physical custody of T.J.H., on October 21 , 2016 in
Bmmeville County Case No. CV-2016-5707, Shad Lewis Hamberlin v. Jordain LeAnn Bradford,
with Judge L. Mark Riddoch presiding. (R. p. 32, Aff. of Shad Lewis Hamberlin~ 10; R. p. 49,
Aff. of Jordain LeAnn Bradford in Resp. to Aff. of Shad Lewis Hamberlin ~~ 20-21; R. pp. 1116, Pet. to Establish Child Custody and Child Suppo1i.) On February 10, 2017, during the course
of the custody proceedings in the underlying magistrate comi action, Jordain filed a Motion to
Rescind the V AP on the grounds of material mistake of fact. (R. pp. 167-68, Mot. to Rescind
Acknowledgment of Paternity Affidavit.) Jordain filed an Amended Motion for Stay of
Proceedings Pending Paternity Test and/or Determination of Biological Father of Minor Child
and supporting affidavit on February 10, 2017, in which Jordain alleged that her execution of the
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VAP, specifically her statement therein that Shad was the biological father of T.J.H., was a
material mistake of fact. (R. pp. 169-170, Am. Mot. for Stay of Proceedings Pending Paternity
Test and/or Determination of Biological Father of Minor Child; R. pp. 171-173, Am. Aff. of
Resp. in Supp. of Mot. for Stay of Proceedings Pending Paternity Test and/or Determination of
Biological Father of Minor Child.)
On March 15, 2017, Jordain filed an Amended Verified Motion to Rescind
Acknowledgment of Paternity Affidavit, in which Jordain alleged material mistake in her former
identification of Shad as T.J.H's father, as she later realized she had sexual relations with
Matthew Edwards (Matthew) during the timeframe ofT.J.H. ' s conception, and that Matthew
voluntarily underwent paternity testing resulting in a 99.99% chance that Matthew is T.J.H. 's
biological father. (R. pp. 204-205, Am. Ver. Mot. to Rescind Acknowledgment of Paternity Aff.

,r,r 1, 4; R. pp. 209-15, March 14, 2017 Aff. of Matthew Edwards.)
Shad filed an objection to Jordain's amended verified motion to rescind the VAP on
March 20, 2017. (R. pp. 216-2019, Obj. to Am. Mot. to Rescind Acknowledgment of Paternity
Affidavit.) On March 30, 2017, the magistrate court issued an order denying Jordain's motions to
stay the proceedings and rescind the VAP. (R. pp. 228-30, Order on Various Motions.)
On May 12, 2017, Jordain filed a Motion for Order Ce1iifying Order and Granting
Permissive Appeal, requesting the magistrate comi ce1iify as final the portion of its Order on
Various Motions regarding Jordain's motion to rescind the YAP. (R. pp. 291-92, Mot. for Order
Certifying Order and Granting Permissive Appeal.) On May 31 , 2017, the magistrate court
entered its orders granting Jordain's motion for permissive appeal and Jordain's motion to ce1iify
as final the magistrate comi's order denying Jordain's motion to rescind the V AP. (R. pp. 30708, Order Granting Mot. for Permissive Appeal; R. pp. 309-311, Order Granting Mot. to Certify
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Order as Final.) Jordain filed her Notice of Appeal to the district court, in its appellate capacity,
on July 18, 2017. (R. pp. 318-20, Notice of Appeal.)
Following oral argument on Jordain's appeal to the district court on October 25, 2017,
District Judge Joel E. Tingey issued his Decision on Appeal on November 9, 2017, in which he
affirmed the magistrate court's decision denying Jordain's motion to rescind the V AP. (R. pp.
365-66, Minute Entry; R. pp. 367-76, Decision on Appeal.) Jordain filed her Notice of Appeal
of the district court's decision on December 6, 2017. (R. pp. 378-80.)
C. Statement of Facts.
Shad and Jordain were involved in a sexual relationship prior to the bi11h of T.J.H. on
September 24, 2014, causing both parties to believe Shad was the father ofT.J.H. (R. p. 31, Aff.
of Shad Lewis Hamberlin~ 3; see generally R. pp. 45-52, Aff. of Jordain LeAnn Bradford in
Resp. to Aff. of Shad Lewis Hamberlin.) In fm1herance of this belief, Jordain and Shad executed
the VAP on July 7, 2015, in which Jordain stated, "I acknowledge that the man named above
[Shad] is the biological father of my child. I consent to the recording of his name, date, and place
of bi11h on the birth certificate of the above child [T.J.H.]." (R. p. 160, Objection to Mot. for Stay
of Proceedings Pending Paternity Test and/or Determination of Biological Father of Minor Child
Ex. A, Acknowledgment of Paternity Affidavit.) The State ofldaho, via the Idaho Depai1ment of
Health and Welfare Bureau of Vital Records and Health Statistics, issued a Ce11ificate of Live
Birth for T.J.H., on which Shad is listed as T.J.H.'s father. (R. p. 161, Obj. to Mot. for Stay of
Proceedings Pending Paternity Test and/or Determination of Biological Father of Minor Child
Ex. B, Certificate of Live Bi11h.)
Since executing the V AP, Jordain has alleged a material mistake of fact in her
identification of Shad as the biological father of T.J.H., alleging instead that Matthew is T.J.H. 's
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biological father. (See generally R. pp. 204-208, Am. Ver. Mot. to Rescind Acknowledgment of
Paternity Aff.) Jordain alleged that at the time she learned she was pregnant with T.B.H. in late
March or early April 2014, she was dating Shad and believed Shad to be T.B.H.'s father. (Id. at ,r
3.) Jordain alleged that she did not contact Matthew about the pregnancy because she and Shad
had calculated the date of conception as a time when Jordain and Shad had sexual relations. (Id.
at ,r 3.) Jordain alleged further that after the end of her relationship with Shad, she renewed
contact with Matthew and, after conversations with Matthew regarding the date of conception of
T.J.H., " it became apparent to [Jordain] that [she] may have made a mistake of fact that [Shad]
was the biological father of [T.B.H.]." (Id. at ,r 4.) Matthew underwent voluntaiy paternity
testing in November 2016 and March 2017, with each test resulting in a 99.99% chance that
Matthew is the biological father of T.B.H. (R. pp. 209-15, March 14, 2017 Aff. of Matthew
Edwards.)

II.

ADDITIONAL ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A. Whether Shad is entitled to his attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code
§ 12-121 and Rules 40 and 41 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.

III.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Shad is entitled to his attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121

and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41. See IDAHO CODE § 12-121 (2018); IDAHO APP. R. 40
(2018); IDAHO APP. R. 41 (2018). See infi·a.

IV.

ARGUMENT
A. Standard of Review
As the appellant, Jordain has the burden of establishing error on behalf of the district

court. Trotter v. Bank ofN Y Mellon, 152 Idaho 842, 848, 275 P.3d 857, 863 (2012); Chapman
v. Chapman, 147 Idaho 756,764,215 P.3d 476, 484 (2009). Appellate courts review decisions
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addressing child custody disputes under an abuse of discretion standard. Clair v. Clair, 153
Idaho 278,282,281 P.3d 115, 119 (2012).
Under an abuse of discretion standard, appellate comis review a lower court's exercise of
discretion in a '"three-tiered inquiry: (1) whether the lower comi rightly perceived the issue as
one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and
consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the comi
reached its decision by an exercise ofreason."' Pelayo v. Pelayo, 154 Idaho 855,861,303 P.3d
214,220 (2013) (quoting Stewart v. Stewart, 143 Idaho 673, 678, 152 P.3d 544, 549 (2007)). "If
findings of fact are supp01ied by substantial and competent, although conflicting, evidence, those
findings will not be disturbed on appeal." Desfosses v. Desfosses, 120 Idaho 354,356, 815 P.2d
1094, 1096 (Ct.App. 1991) (citing Pierson v. Jones, 102 Idaho 82, 85,625 P.2d 1085, 1088
(1981)); see also Tisdale v. Tisdale, 127 Idaho 331,333,900 P.2d 807,809 (1995). "If the law
has been properly applied to those facts found, the judgment will be affinned, and upheld on
further appeal." Desfosses, 120 Idaho at 356, 815 P.2d at 1096 (citing Hentges v. Hentges , 115
Idaho 192, 194, 765 P.2d 1094, 1096 (Ct.App. 1988)).
Idaho appellate comis have routinely declined to search an appellate record for
unspecified errors. In re Clark, 153 Idaho 349,356,283 P.3d 96, 103 (2012); Bach v. Bagley,
148 Idaho 784,790,229 P.3d 1146, 1152 (2010); Idaho Dep 't of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 150
Idaho 103,113,244 P.3d 247, 257 (Ct.App. 2010). Idaho appellate comis require argument and a
specific assignment of error under the Idaho Appellate Rules in order for an issue to be preserved
and deemed properly brought before the Court. See Suitts v. Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 708, 117 P.3d
120, 122 (2005).
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The Idaho Supreme Court has m1iculated the standard for preserving issues on appeal,
noting that " [i]ssues on appeal are not considered unless they are properly supported by both
authority and argument." Hurtado v. Land O 'Lakes, Inc., 153 Idaho 13, 18, 278 P.3d 415, 420
(2012) (citing Gem State Ins. Co. v. Hutchison , 245 Idaho 10, 16, 175 P.3d 172, 178 (2007))
(emphasis added). The Com1 has ruled that an issue is waived when no argument or authority is
cited in supp011 of the issue. Ball v. City of Blackfoot, 152 Idaho 673,678,273 P.3d 1266, 1271
(2012) (citing State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259,263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996)). In Maclay v.

Idaho Road Estate Commission, the Idaho Court of Appeals declined to hear arguments that
were not suppo11ed by argument or authority in the opening brief. 154 Idaho 540, 548, 300 P.3d
616,624 (2012) (citing Hogg v. Wolske, 142 Idaho 549,559, 130 P.3d 1087, 1097 (2006)); see

also State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490,500, 198 P.3d 128, 138 (Ct.App. 2008).
B. The district court did not abuse its discretion in applying a reasonable person
standard to the rescission requirements of Idaho Code§ 7-1106.
1. Jordain's requested interpretation of Idaho Code§ 7-1106 would result in an
absurd application.

Jordain limits the legal analysis and argument in her appellate brief to one issue: whether
the district court abused its discretion in applying a reasonable person standard to the rescission
requirements in Idaho Code§ 7-1106. (App. Brief 8.) Idaho Code§ 7-1106 establishes the legal
effect of voluntary acknowledgments of paternity for Idaho bi11h and provides the framework by
which such acknowledgments may be rescinded. IDAHO CODE§ 7-1106 (2018). While any pm1y
may rescind a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity within 60 days after the acknowledgment
is filed, Idaho Code § 7-1106 limits the grounds on which a party may challenge or seek
rescission of a prior acknowledgment after the initial 60-day period to fraud, duress, or material
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mistake of fact, with the burden of proof upon the party seeking to challenge or rescind the
acknowledgment. Id.
Jordain argues that because Idaho Code § 7-1106 does not reference a reasonable person
standard in aiiiculating the grounds on which a party may challenge a voluntary
acknowledgment of paternity after the initial 60-day rescission period, the district court abused
its discretion in applying such a standard in affirming the magistrate court's decision denying
Jordain's motion to rescind the VAP. However, Jordain' s interpretation of the statutory language
calls for an absurd result that favors semantics over public policy, while ignoring settled Idaho
jurisprudence regarding statutory interpretation and application.
This Court has previously articulated the methodology by which a comi is to interpret a
statute:
When interpreting a statute, the Court begins with an examination of the literal
words of the statute. Grand Canyon Dories v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 124 Idaho
1, 5, 855 P.2d 462, 466 (1993); State ex rel. Lisby v. Lisby, 126 Idaho 776, 779,
890 P.2d 727, 730 (1995). The language of the statute is to be given its plain,
obvious and rational meaning. Lisby, 126 Idaho at 779, 890 P.2d at 730. A
statute is to be construed as a whole without separating one provision from
another. George W. Watkins Family v. Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 539, 797 P.2d
1385, 1387 (1990). The Court should also construe statutes under the assumption
that the legislature knew of all legal precedent and other statutes in existence at
the time the statute was passed. City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Indep. Highway
Dist. , 126 Idaho 145, 150, 879 P.2d 1078, 1083 (1994). Last, in attempting to
discern and implement the intent of the legislature, the Comi may seek edification
from the statute's legislative history and contemporaneous context at
enactment. Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Ada County, 123 Idaho 410, 416,
849 P.2d 83 , 89 (1993). However, if statutory language is clear and unambiguous,
the Court need merely apply the statute without engaging in any statutory
construction. State v. Hagerman Water Right Owners, Inc. , 130 Idaho 727, 732,
947 P.2d 400, 405 (1997).
State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 644, 659, 978 P.2d 214,219 (1999) (emphasis added). When
adopting the Court's prior rulings on statutory interpretation, it becomes apparent that the district
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court c01Tectly exercised its discretion in affirming the magistrate court's prior decision denying
Jordain's motion to rescind the VAP on the basis of material mistake of fact.
On appeal, Jordain requests this Court find that the district comi abused its discretion in
determining that Jordain was required, as the moving paiiy, to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that her alleged material mistake of fact in identifying T.J.H's biological father was a
reasonable mistake justifying rescission. (App. Brief 8; see also R. 374, Decision on Appeal 8.)
However, Jordain' s requested interpretation of the statute calls for an interpretation of the statute
that is neither plain, obvious, nor rational. See Burnight, 132 Idaho at 659, 978 P.2d at 219.
Under Jordain's proposed interpretation of the statute, any paiiy could challenge a voluntary
acknowledgment of paternity months or years after the initial sixty-day rescission period by
alleging that the paiiy made any kind of "material" mistake, with such degree of materiality
measured by the party challenging the acknowledgment of paternity. Such an interpretation is
problematic for myriad reasons, not the least of which being that it would completely eviscerate
the burden of the party seeking to challenge the acknowledgment of paternity to do so by clear
and convincing evidence, as the moving party could merely allege that he or she made a
"material" mistake of fact. In contrast, utilizing a reasonable person standard, as demonstrated by
the magistrate comi and the district court, preserves the moving paiiy ' s burden in objectively
establishing the existence of material mistake by clear and convincing evidence.
Without employing a reasonable person standard to gauge such a claim of material
mistake of fact, the grounds by which a person could challenge a previously-filed
acknowledgment of paternity would become entirely subjective in nature, frustrating both the
legislative intent in passing Idaho Code § 7-1106 and public policy related to the statute. By
enacting Idaho Code § 7-1106, the legislature signaled its intent to expressly limit the cases in
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which a party could later challenge a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity to those situations
in which the moving party can establish, by clear and convincing evidence, the presence of fraud,
duress, or material mistake of fact. Undoubtedly such express limitations on a pmiy's ability to
later rescind an acknowledgment of paternity helps provide ce1iainty in a minor child ' s life,
while simultaneously limiting a party's ability to weaponize a voluntary acknowledgment of
paternity in later custody proceedings.
The reasonable person standard employed by both the magistrate court and the district
comt is appropriate under Idaho Code § 7-1106, given the plain, obvious, and rational meaning
of the statutory language. Without application of the reasonable person standard, courts would be
hampered in their ability to properly address a late challenge to a voluntary acknowledgment of
paternity. Given the Cami's prior statement that " [i]n the final analysis we must decide the
question on the basis of what we deem to be a reasonable statutory interpretation, consistent with
public policy and purpose," the district comi' s application of a reasonable person standard was
an appropriate exercise of its discretion, and Jordain has failed to establish an abuse of discretion
by the district court. C. Forsman Real Estate Co., Inc. v. Hatch, 97 Idaho 511 , 520, 547 P.2d
1116, 1120 (1976).

2. The legislative history ofldaho Code§ 7-1106 and legal precedent support
the district court's application of a reasonable person standard.
While the plain, obvious, and rational meaning ofldaho Code§ 7-1106' s language
addressing post-rescission period challenges to a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity calls
for application of a reasonable person standard, as set forth above, supra, the district court also
correctly exercised its discretion in looking to Idaho case law imposing a reasonable person
standard when discussing setting aside a judgment under the analogous requirements of Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(l). (See R. pp. 373-75, Decision on Appeal 7-9.)
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It has been long-established by this Court that, when faced with questions of statutory
construction, "[i]t is assumed that when the legislature enacts or amends a statute it has full
knowledge of the existing judicial decisions and case law of the state." George W Watkins

Family v. Messenger, 118 Idaho 537,540, 797 P.2d 1385, 1388 (1990) (abrogated on other
grounds, Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 895-96, 265 P.3d
502, 508-09 (2011)) (internal citations omitted). A review of the legislative history ofldaho
Code § 7-1106, in conjunction with contemporary legal precedence, provide further justification
for the district comi's application of a reasonable person standard when affirming the magistrate
court's prior decision denying Jordain's motion to rescind the VAP on grounds of mistake.
Prior to the legislature's 1996 revision to Idaho Code § 7-1106, the statute did not
include language regarding a party's ability to challenge a voluntary acknowledgment of
paternity. See IDAHO CODE § 7-1106 (1995). However, in 1996, the Idaho legislature amended
Idaho Code § 7-1106 to include the initial 60-day rescission period and expressly limit the
grounds on which paiiies could later challenge voluntary paternity acknowledgments to fraud,
duress, or material mistake of fact. See S.B. 1307, 1996 Leg., 53rd Sess. (2nd Reg. Sess.) (Idaho
1996) (enacted); see also IDAHO CODE§ 7-1106 (2018).
At the time the legislature amended Idaho Code § 7-1106 to limit the grounds on which a
party could challenge a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity beyond the initial 60-day
rescission period to circumstances of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact, Idaho
jurisprudence was replete with interpretation of the "analogous" provision allowing judgments to
be set aside on grounds of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect under Idaho Rule
of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b )( 1), as referenced by the district court in its Decision on Appeal.
(R. pp. 374-375, Decision on Appeal 8-9.) See also Gordon v. Hedrick, 159 Idaho 604,610,364
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P.3d 941,957 (2015). Specifically, the Avondale and Kovachy cases cited by the district court in
its appellate decision, both issued before 1996, establish that courts interpreted "mistake"
language similar to that in Idaho Code § 7-1106, as amended in 1996, as being subject to a
reasonable person or reasonably prudent standard. (Id.) See Avondale On Hayden, Inc. v. Hall,
104 Idaho 321, 325-26, 658 P.2d 992, 996-97 (Ct.App. 1983); Kovachy v. DeLeusomme, 122
Idaho 973 , 974, 842 P.2d 309,310 (Ct.App. 1992)).
Under the standard aiiiculated by the Idaho Supreme Comi in the Messenger case, it is
assumed that the legislature knew of the language in Rule 60(b)(l) analogous to the amended
language ofldaho Code § 7-1106, as well as judicial interpretation of Rule 60 requiring that a
party seeking to set aside a judgment on grounds of mistake must show it has acted with
reasonable prudence. See Messenger, 118 Idaho at 540, 797 P .2d at 13 88 (internal citations
omitted). By amending the language ofldaho Code§ 7-1106 to include references to mistake as
a basis for rescinding a voluntary paternity acknowledgment, given the jurisprudence interpreting
the similar language of Rule 60(b )( 1) as requiring a showing of reasonable prudence, the
legislature tacitly approved a reasonable person standard for determining the existence of a
material mistake of fact sufficient to rescind a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity.
Under both an analysis of the plain, obvious, and rational meaning ofldaho Code§ 71106, as well as a review of its legislative history and related legal precedent, the district court
correctly exercised its discretion in applying a reasonable person standard in its Decision on
Appeal. Jordain, as the moving paiiy, has failed to establish eITor on behalf of the district court,
and the district court's judgment should be affirmed and upheld on appeal.
C. Jordain has failed to provide any legal authority in support of her argument that
the district court abused its discretion in finding Jordain did not act reasonably.
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Jordain focuses the majority of her appellate brief on her argument that the district comt,
and the magistrate court before it, e1Ted in finding that Jordain did not act as a reasonable person.
(App. Brief 9-10.) However, in so arguing, Jordain does not cite to any legal authority or provide
any legal argument in supp011 of her position. (See id.)
As noted above, supra, the Idaho Supreme Comt has held that "[i]ssues on appeal are not
considered unless they are properly supp01ted by both authority and argument." Hurtado v. Land

O'Lakes, Inc., 153 Idaho 13, 18,278 P.3d 415,420 (2012) (citing Gem State Ins. Co. v.
Hutchison, 245 Idaho 10, 16, 175 P .3d 172, 178 (2007)) (emphasis added). A party waives an
issue on appeal when the party fails to cite authority in support of the issue, and appellate courts
have declined to hear arguments that were not supp01ted by legal authority in the opening brief.

Ball v. City of Blackfoot, 152 Idaho 673,678,273 P.3d 1266, 1271 (2012) (citing State v. Zichko,
129 Idaho 259,263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996)); Maclay v. Idaho Road Estate Comm 'n, 154
Idaho 540, 548, 300 P.3d 616, 624 (2012) (citing Hogg v. Wolske, 142 Idaho 549, 559, 130 P.3d
1087, 1097 (2006)).
Rather than provide any legal authority in support of her argument that the district court
abused its discretion in finding that Jordain acted unreasonably, Jordain invites this Court to
reweigh the evidence in the record. However, "[i]t is not this Court's role to reweigh evidence."

Frontier Development Group, LLCv. Caravella, 157 Idaho 589,595,338 P.3d 1193, 1199
(2014) (citing PacifiCorp. v. Idaho State Tax Comm 'n, 153 Idaho 759,768,291 P.3d 442,451
(2012)).
Ultimately, Jordain's argument in supp011 of her contention that the district comt abused
its discretion in determining that she acted unreasonably underscores the need for application of
a reasonable person standard when a party seeks to rescind a voluntary paternity
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acknowledgment on the grounds of material mistake. As noted above, supra, were such a
standard not adopted by the reviewing court, every case in which material mistake of fact is
alleged by the party challenging the voluntary acknowledgment of paternity would be replete
with the type of argument Jordain makes on appeal: that because Jordain considers her actions to
be reasonable, Jordain's subjective opinion regarding her own actions constitutes primafacie
evidence that such behavior is reasonable and justifies rescission of the VAP more than three
years after Jordain executed the VAP, and almost four years after the bi11h ofT.J.H. As
addressed earlier, supra, this interpretation of Idaho Code § 7-1106 is absurd and would
completely do away with the burden of the pm1y challenging the voluntary acknowledgment of
paternity, as well as render meaningless the express limitations on a party' s ability to challenge
such acknowledgments after the initial rescission period.
Jordain has failed to establish any error or abuse of discretion by the district com1 in
entering its Decision on Appeal and affirn1ing the magistrate court's denial of Jordain' s motion
to rescind the V AP. Because Jordain, as the appellant, has failed to meet her burden in providing
cogent legal authority establishing that the district com1 abused its discretion in issuing its
Decision on Appeal, the Court should affirm the district court' s decision.

D. Shad should be awarded his attorney fees on appeal.
Shad should be granted his attorney fees and costs on appeal. Idaho Appellate Rule 41
allows a pm1y to affirmatively seek attorney fees on appeal. IDAHO APP . R. 41 (2018). A basis for
attorney fees must be presented in a party's first appellate brief in order to avoid waiver of a
claim for attorney fees. Id. A party prevailing on appeal is likewise entitled to costs. IDAHO APP.
R. 40 (2018).
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1. Jordain's appeal is frivolous and unfounded, and Shad is entitled to fees and
costs pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41.

Idaho Code§ 12-121 provides a mechanism for awarding attorney fees to Shad. An
appellate court "will award fees to a prevailing pmiy under Idaho Code section 12-121 when the
Comi believes 'that the action was pursued, defended, or brought frivolously, umeasonably, or
without foundation."' Sweet v. Foreman, 159 Idaho 761,367 P.3d 156, 162 (2016) (quoting
Idaho Military Historical Soc 'y, Inc. v. Maslen, 156 Idaho 624,633,329 P.3d 1072, 1081

(2014)). "When an appellant fails to present a cogent argument as to why he should prevail, an
award to his opponent is appropriate." Turner v. Turner, l 55 Idaho 819, 827, 317 P.3d 716, 724
(2013) (citing Chicoine v. Bignall, 127 Idaho 225,228, 899 P.2d 438,441 (1995)). An award of
attorney fees is appropriate under Idaho Code § 12-121 "if the appeal simply invites this Court to
'second-guess the trial court on conflicting evidence."' Turner, 155 Idaho at 827,317 P.3d at
724 (quoting Hogg v. Wolske, 142 Idaho 549,559, 130 P.3d 1087, 1097 (2006)).
Idaho Code§ 12-121 is specifically designed to compensate parties who are dragged into
the legal process without an underlying fair or reasonable dispute. See IDAHO CODE 12-121
(2018). This appeal is just such a case, where Jordain, without any legal basis, invites this Court
to disregard and "second guess" the district court's prior decision, following the district court's
refusal to do so to the magistrate court's order denying Jordain's motion to rescind the VAP.
Such conduct should justify an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-121. "Normally,
this Comi will award attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-121 if the appeal merely invites the
Comi to reweigh the evidence or second guess the lower comi, or if the appeal was brought or
defended frivolously, umeasonably, or without foundation." Ketterling v. Burger King Corp.,
152 Idaho 555,562,272 P.3d 527,534 (2012). See also In re Doe, 157 Idaho 14, 19,333 P.3d
125, 130 (2014). Jordain's appeal is frivolous and lacks foundation, and Shad should be awarded
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his attorney fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and
41.

2. Jordain is not entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 12-121, Idaho
Appellate Rules 40 or 41, or any other rule or statute.
Jordain is not entitled to attorney fees and costs under any of the rules or statutes she
cited in her appellate brief, or under any other avenue of Idaho law. As established above, supra,
the district court co1Tectly exercised its discretion in affirming the magistrate court in its
Decision on Appeal, and Jordain has failed to meet her burden as the appellant to establish error
on behalf of the district comi. Trotter v Bank of NY Mellon, 152 Idaho 842,848,275 P.3d 857,
863 (2012); Chapman v. Chapman, 147 Idaho 756,764,215 P.3d 476,484 (2009). For the
reasons stated above, supra, the Comi should affirm the district comi's Decision on Appeal.
Further, because Jordain has failed to meet her burden as appellant, Jordain is not the prevailing
party and is not entitled to attorney fees or costs. The Comi should accordingly deny Jordain's
request for attorney fees and costs on appeal.
V.

CONCLUSION
As a result of the foregoing, the Comi should affirm the district comi's Decision on

Appeal and award Shad his attorney fees and costs on appeal.
DATED: July 31, 2018.

·· opher D. Meek
Megan D. Hopfer.
Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA
Attorneys for Petitioner/Respondent
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